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CLEAR AS MUD: CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
WITH CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
C. ASHLEY SAFERIGHT*
ABSTRACT
Rape and sexual assault laws and policies have shifted significantly in recent years,
including the introduction of affirmative consent. Unfortunately, both proponents and
critics tend to confuse the issues and falsely equate affirmative consent as a substantive
social standard versus a procedural standard for adjudication and punishment.
Although affirmative consent generally does not represent a significant change in
consent law in the United States, statutes and policies requiring a further requirement
that affirmative consent be clear and unambiguous (“clear affirmative consent”) are
problematic and raise constitutional concerns. When clear affirmative consent policies
are used as an adjudicative standard, they increase the dangers of policing sex and may
punish even consenting adults. Further, clear affirmative consent policies are
unconstitutional because: they are unconstitutionally overbroad; they violate
substantive due process rights as unconstitutionally vague; and they violate the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and the privacy rights of consenting adults.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Yeah, that’s her. With the gold. I better use some Tic Tacs just in case I
start kissing her. You know, I'm automatically attracted to beautiful–I just
start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when
you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. . . Grab ’em by the
pussy. You can do anything.”1
This oft-quoted and much maligned statement of now President Donald Trump is
a stark illustration of “rape culture.”2 Sexual assaults are a significant problem across
the United States, and in particular on college campuses. 3 According to a 2015 study
conducted by the Association of American Universities, more than twenty-seven
percent of female college seniors reported having experienced some form of sexual
assault while enrolled in college.4 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) reports that 18.3% of adult women have been raped, with 37.4% of female
rape victims being first raped between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four.5 With

* C. Ashley Saferight – J.D. expected, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2019. I would
like to extend unending gratitude for those who provided guidance and feedback throughout the
research and drafting process, including Stephen R. Lazarus, Kevin F. O’Neill, and the editors
of the Cleveland State Law Review. I would also like to give special thanks to my fiancé,
Michael Curry, for his unwavering support and encouragement.
1 Mark Makela, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html.

Emanuella Grinberg, Trump’s ‘Locker Room Talk’ Stirs Real Talk About Sexual
Violence, CNN (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/11/health/trump-locker-roomtalk-reaction/index.html.
2

3 Claude Mellins et al., Sexual Assault Incidents Among College Undergraduates:
Prevalence and Factors Associated with Risk, NAT’L CTR FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Nov. 8,
2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5695602/.
4 AAU Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct, ASS’N OF AM. U. (Sept.
3, 2015),
https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aau-climate-survey-sexual-assault-and-sexualmisconduct-2015.
5 Statistics on Sexual Violence in the United States, TESTIMONY PROJECT,
https://www.thetestimonyprojectdc.com/statistics-on-sexual-violence-in-the-united-states/
(last visited Jan. 30, 2019); Michele C. Black et al., National Intimate Partner and Sexual
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statistics like these, it is no surprise that rape and sexual assault have garnered
increasing scrutiny and media attention, particularly on college campuses.
But the cautionary tale of the young woman, walking alone at night, being pulled
into the bushes and raped by a stranger is not the reality for the vast majority of these
women. More than half of all female rape victims report that the perpetrator was an
intimate partner.6
From September 2014 until graduation in May 2015, Columbia University student
Emma Sulkowicz carried a fifty-pound dorm mattress around campus to protest
Columbia’s failure to hold her alleged rapist responsible for sexual misconduct,
stemming from what started as a consensual encounter.7 Arguably, this act of
performance-art, titled “Mattress Performance (Carry That Weight),” was the catalyst
that spurred sexual assault discussions, protests, and the adoption of stringent new
policies designed to improve campus response to sexual assault. 8
Rape and sexual assault law has evolved significantly over time: from the common
law recognition of rape as a property crime against a woman’s husband or father;9 to
requiring physical force from the perpetrator and utmost physical resistance from the
victim;10 to eventual passage of shield laws not allowing a victim’s sexual history to
be used against her in court;11 and finally, to recognition of marital, date, and
acquaintance rape as crimes.12 These changes have signified an inexorable and
inevitable march towards affirmative consent as the desirable and necessary standard
to keep women safe.13

Violence Survey: 2010 Summary Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, (Nov.
2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf.
6

National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, supra note 5.

7 Kate Taylor, Mattress Protest at Columbia University Continues into Graduation Event,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/nyregion/mattress-protestat-columbia-university-continues-into-graduation-event.html.
8 Jeannie Suk Gerson, College Students Go to Court Over Sexual Assault, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/colleges-go-to-court-oversexual-assault.
9 Ethan Bronner, A Candidate’s Stumble on a Distressing Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/us/definition-of-rape-is-shifting-rapidly.html
(stating that marriage was a “transfer of property from father to husband and if someone
deflowered the virgin, that removed the property rights of the father. Rape was about stealing
his property.”).
10

People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1986).

11 The Federal Rules of Evidence were amended October 28, 1978 to include the first
version of a rape shield law. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
12

Lily Rothman, When Spousal Rape First Became a Crime in the U.S., TIME (July 28,
2015), http://time.com/3975175/spousal-rape-case-history/.
13 Jake New, The ‘Yes Means Yes' World, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adoptingaffirmative-consent-sexual-assault-policies (discussing how over 800 colleges in the United
States have adopted affirmative consent policies).
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Affirmative consent has become exceptionally polarized—it is either held up as
the gold standard or vilified as a gross overreach of government. 14 There seems to be
significant confusion as to the actual definition of affirmative consent. 15 Is it enough
to say that “only yes means yes?”16 Does affirmative consent require a verbal
statement of consent?17 In addition, both proponents and opponents of affirmative
consent lack clarity in their support for, or objection to, affirmative consent as a
substantive rule versus a procedural standard for adjudication.18
This Note will argue that although affirmative consent generally does not
represent a significant change in consent law in the United States, statutes and policies
requiring a further requirement that affirmative consent be clear and unambiguous
(“clear affirmative consent”) are problematic and raise constitutional concerns. This
Note will focus exclusively on clear affirmative consent policies and will argue that
such policies increase the dangers of policing sex and may punish even consenting
adults. Further, clear affirmative consent policies are unconstitutional for several
reasons: they are unconstitutionally overbroad; they violate First Amendment free
speech rights; they violate substantive due process rights as unconstitutionally vague;
and they violate the constitutional right to privacy.
Part II-A of this Note will provide a historical overview of rape and sexual assault
law and policy in the United States, will comprehensively discuss the confusion
surrounding definitions of affirmative consent, and will explain how clear affirmative
consent policies differ from general affirmative consent policies. Part II-A will also
clarify the distinctions between affirmative consent as a substantive social rule (how
individuals are expected to act) and clear affirmative consent as the procedural
standard (adjudication and punishment). This Note will argue that although
affirmative consent is an appropriate and desirable social rule, as an adjudicative
standard, clear affirmative consent policies do not effectively protect victims of rape
and sexual assault, and they also raise constitutional concerns, as they violate rights
of consenting adults. Using an adjudicative standard that is fundamentally flawed and
intrudes upon the rights of law-abiding citizens significantly harms the position of
victim’s rights advocates. Such a flawed standard provides ammunition for critics to
dismiss the claims of women more easily and further perpetuates the myth of vast
numbers of false rape reports.

14 Compare Michael Fein, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexualharassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html
(opposing
Harvard’s
affirmative consent standard), with Wendy Murphy, Harvard Gets it Right on Sexual Assault,
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/12/02/harvard-getsright-sexual-assault/mmM8hZRndrtP9MAPXwOvtM/story.html
(supporting
Harvard’s
affirmative consent standard).
15 Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Unpacking Affirmative Consent: Not As Great As You Hope, Not
As Bad As You Fear, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 57, 58 (2016) (“The phrase ‘yes means yes’ is a
slogan (perhaps a good one), not an actual legal standard or an explanation of a legal standard.
Affirmative consent does not require ‘express verbal agreement.’”).
16

Id. at 65–66.

17

Id. at 66.

18

Id. at 84.
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Part II will also include a brief discussion of Title IX’s role in the campus sexual
assault adjudication process (II-B) and introductions to the constitutional guarantees
of free speech (II-C) and privacy (II-D). Part III-A will discuss the dangers presented
by clear affirmative consent policies as related to policing sex and Part III-B will
provide a cautionary tale of a university student who was expelled from school due to
an alleged sexual assault, despite both parties stating that the sexual encounter was
consensual.
Part IV-A will argue that clear affirmative consent policies are unconstitutionally
overbroad. Part IV-B will make a case that clear affirmative consent policies violate
free speech and will examine expressive conduct as speech, the compelled speech
doctrine, and prohibited government restriction of speech. Part IV-C will examine
substantive due process and will argue that clear affirmative consent policies are
unconstitutionally vague. Finally, Part IV-C will investigate the dangers of clear
affirmative consent as the standard in criminal prosecutions and will contend that these
policies violate the constitutional right to privacy as part of the liberty guarantee of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process clauses.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Affirmative Consent: What is it and how did we get here?
To fully understand the discourse and controversy surrounding the affirmative
consent standard, it is important to identify common misconceptions about what
affirmative consent is and to discuss how the history and evolution of rape and sexual
assault law in the United States has shaped the conversations about consent that are
ongoing today.
1. History and Evolution of Rape and Sexual Assault Law
Upon examining the history of rape and sexual assault law, it becomes
immediately clear that it is inextricable from sexism and misogyny19 and is
laden with historical baggage and political half-steps.”20 The state of modern rape law
has been described as “the product of a set of imperfect compromises, based upon
historical contingencies,” with competing political forces shaping the slow evolution
of consent.21
Even into the 1970s, the common law definition of rape was largely designed to
protect male interests, with little regard for victims’ rights. 22 The traditional common
law elements of rape were: “(1) sexual intercourse; (2) between a man and a woman
who is not his wife; (3) achieved by force or threat of severe bodily harm; and (4)
without her consent.”23 Courts routinely interpreted the non-consent and force
requirements to require that a woman’s resistance rise to the level of a “valiant struggle

19

People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118 (Cal. 1986) (discussing the history of rape law, and
emphasizing that the resistance requirement stemmed from a distrust of women); Anne M.
Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 5, 13 (Feb. 1998).
20

Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 5 (2015).

21

Id.

22

Id. at 15.

23

Id.
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to uphold her honor” and must be “to the utmost limit of her power.” 24 Courts held
that even when threatened with specific violence, if a victim eventually stopped
resisting, such “voluntary” submission to a rapist would amount to consent.25 In
addition, courts were permitted to consider a victim’s past sexual behavior—with the
defendant or others—to question her credibility as a witness and prove consent. 26 Most
jurisdictions required corroboration because a woman’s testimony was considered to
be inherently untrustworthy, and therefore, insufficient to show non-consent by
itself.27
The feminist movement significantly influenced rape law reform. 28 Michigan
became the first state to substantially reform rape law in the mid-1970s.29 Over the
next twenty years, rape law reform took hold, leading to major changes, including:
abandoning of gender-specific terms in favor of gender-neutrality; criminalizing all
types of penetration, rather than just vaginal intercourse; and criminalizing marital
rape.30 Nevertheless, courts continued to reverse rape convictions where the
complainant exhibited little or no resistance, even where consent was objectively
absent.31 Even a verbal “no” was not enough in many circumstances32 and it was not
until much later that the idea of “no means no” even took hold.33
Only recently have jurisdictions abandoned the requirement of force. 34 In 1991,
the Senate Report for the Violence Against Women Act of 1991 acknowledged the
“subtle prejudices” against rape victims in the legal system and that rape prosecutions
24

People v. Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).

25

Yung, supra note 20, at 15.

26

People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 117 (Cal. 1986); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 47–49
(1987).
27 Barnes, 721 P.2d at 117–18 (“The requirement that a woman resist her attacker appears
to have been grounded in the basic distrust with which courts and commentators traditionally
viewed a woman's testimony regarding sexual assault. According to the 17th century writings
of Lord Matthew Hale, in order to be deemed a credible witness, a woman had to be of good
fame, disclose the injury immediately, suffer signs of injury and cry out for help.”) (internal
citations omitted).
28 Jason M. Price, Sex, Lies, and Rape Shield Statutes: The Constitutionality of Interpreting
Rape Shield Statutes to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Victim's Motive to Fabricate, 18 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 550–51 (1996).
29

Yung, supra note 20, at 15; Price, supra note 28, at 551.

30

Yung, supra note 20, at 15, 20.

31

United States v. Townsend, 34 M.J. 882, 885 (C.G.C.M.R. 1992) (overturning a military
rape conviction when victim did not manifest resistance, but “froze” when her verbal protests
went unheeded); People v. Bales, 169 P.2d 262, 265 (Cal. App. 1946) (reversing rape conviction
where evidence showed no real resistance from complainant).
32 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164 (1994) (finding that woman was not
raped despite repeated verbal “no’s” when victim did not approach the locked door to attempt
to unlock it, and defendant did not use force or threats).
33 Joel Emlen, A Critical Exercise in Effectuating “No Means No” Rape Law, 29 VT. L.
REV. 215, 215, 220 (2004).
34

Yung, supra note 20, at 16; see State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).
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“put the victim—not the attacker—on trial.”35 Until 2012, even the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reporting Program still used a definition of “forcible rape” that originated in
the 1920s: “the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will,” which
only includes forcible penetration of a vagina by a penis, excluding oral or anal
penetration, and excluding vaginal penetration with an object other than a penis. 36 The
new FBI definition states “penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus
with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person,
without the consent of the victim.”37
Historically, defendants in rape or sexual assault proceedings were permitted to
introduce evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual experiences. 38 Rape shield laws
were not widely adopted until the late 1970s, and in 1978, Congress enacted Federal
Rule of Evidence 412, making the sexual history of a victim inadmissible under most
circumstances.39 The historical precedent was steeped in mistrust of women and a
social desire to police the behaviors of women feared to be promiscuous. 40 This led to
decades of rape law that subjugated the sexual autonomy and bodily integrity of
women to the desires of sexually aggressive men. It is no surprise that modern
reformists continued to seek change that would further transform the paradigm. 41
2. Affirmative Consent: Yes Means Yes? Not Exactly
The historical shift of rape and sexual assault law, coupled with the contemporary
climate demanding changes in the prevention and handling of ever-increasing
numbers of sexual assaults, have led to the current highly charged debate.
Unsurprisingly, affirmative consent emerged as a desirable standard.42
Affirmative consent, at its most basic level, simply requires that “some signal of
agreement must be sent by each party to a sexual encounter.” 43 In other words,
affirmative consent simply requires some expression of willingness to participate in a
sexual encounter, rather than depending on the absence of an expression of
unwillingness. Commentators have argued that this represents at most a modest
clarification of what is already the modern practice in rape and sexual assault cases in
most U.S. jurisdictions.44 Affirmative consent is most notoriously described as “only
35

S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 50, 57 (1991).

36

Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/politics/federal-crime-statistics-to-expandrape-definition.html.
37

Id.

38

Price, supra note 28, at 550.

39

Id. at 551.

40 See id. at 550 (“One of the reasons [for allowing inquiry into a victim’s sexual history] .
. . was that unchaste women were considered dishonest. Further, supporters of the common-law
doctrine . . . justified the doctrine by stating that a woman’s unchaste character is probative on
the issue of whether the woman consented to sex on a particular occasion.”).
41

Stephen Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 335–36 (2017).

42

See New, supra note 13.

43

Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 88.

44

Id.
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yes means yes,”45 but this slogan severely oversimplifies the concept, and is in fact
inaccurate as the definition of the legal standard required of affirmative consent. 46
Generally, affirmative consent does not require express verbal permission,47 meaning
many things besides “yes,” can mean “yes.”
While most U.S. jurisdictions do not use affirmative consent to describe the legal
consent element, New Jersey, Illinois, Washington, and Wisconsin all incorporate
language requiring “freely given agreement” for sexual contact. 48 The New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that defendants must believe that “the alleged victim had freely
given affirmative permission” and that “[s]uch permission can be indicated either
through words or through actions that, when viewed in the light of all the surrounding
circumstances, would demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative and freely-given
authorization for the specific act of sexual penetration.” 49 Although the court used the
term “affirmative permission” and clearly articulated permission could be given
through words or actions, it did not further define or clarify the standard.
While affirmative consent as the standard in the criminal context is relatively rare,
it has taken a firm hold on college and university campuses. The National Center for
Higher Education Risk Management reported that as of 2014, over 800 colleges have
adopted an affirmative consent standard.50 The state legislatures in California and New
York even codified the affirmative consent standard, requiring that an affirmative
consent definition be adopted for all state university sexual assault policies. 51
California’s definition is:
“Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary
agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each
45 Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies Regarding
Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 389–90 (2015).
46

Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 66.

47

Id.

48 Id. at 61 n.13 (citing State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) (“Such
permission can be indicated either through words or through actions that, when viewed in the
light of all the surrounding circumstances, would demonstrate to a reasonable person affirmative
and freely-given authorization for the specific act of sexual penetration.”). See, e.g., 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.70(a) (2012) (“‘Consent’ means a freely given agreement to the act of
sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or
submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused shall
not constitute consent.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(7) (2007) (“‘Consent’ means that at
the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”).
49

State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).

Wendy Adele Humphrey, “Let's Talk About Sex”: Legislating and Educating on the
Affirmative Consent Standard, 50 U.S.F.L. REV. 35, 57 (2016).
50

51 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2015)
(“Every institution shall adopt the following definition of affirmative consent as part of its code
of conduct: ‘Affirmative consent is a knowing, voluntary, and mutual decision among all
participants to engage in sexual activity. Consent can be given by words or actions, as long as
those words or actions create clear permission regarding willingness to engage in the sexual
activity. Silence or lack of resistance, in and of itself, does not demonstrate consent.’”).
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person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the
affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity.
Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean
consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity
and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship
between the persons involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between
them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent. 52
Even in states without such legislation, universities around the country are adopting
similar definitions for their sexual assault policies.53
3. Different Standards: Affirmative Consent and Clear Affirmative Consent
Affirmative consent does not mean clear, unambiguous consent. 54 This is perhaps
the most common misconception about affirmative consent and is easily observed in
commentary from both critics and supporters of the affirmative consent standard. 55
Even a survey of dictionary definitions does not support interpreting affirmative to
mean unambiguous.56 While affirmative consent by itself does not impose the
unambiguous standard, there are a small but growing number of policies that also
include an unambiguous or clear consent standard as part of their affirmative consent
definitions.57 This distinction has “gone largely unnoticed in the literature” and
“represents a major change to existing sexual assault law or university policies. Simply
requiring affirmative consent does not.”58
For example, in Columbia University’s 2017 Gender-Based Misconduct
Handbook, students are advised that “[c]onsensual sexual conduct requires affirmative
consent. New York State law defines affirmative consent as a knowing, voluntary and
mutual decision among all participants involved.”59 The policy further explains that
consent may be given “by words or actions, as long as those words or actions clearly
communicate willingness to engage in the sexual activity. It is important not to make
assumptions about consent. If there is confusion or ambiguity, participants need to
stop sexual activity and talk about each person’s willingness to continue.”60

52

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2016).

53

Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 63.

54

Id. at 68.

55

See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV.
1453, 1476 (2014); Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 221, 263–64 (2015).
56

Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 68.

57

Id. at 69.

58

Id. at 68.

59

GENDER-BASED MISCONDUCT POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR STUDENTS, COLUM. U. 4
(Aug.
24,
2018),
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/studentconduct/documents/GBMPolicyandProceduresforStudent
s.pdf.
60

Id. at 9.
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The difficulty in interpreting Columbia’s policy is that the initial language defining
affirmative consent does not contain a requirement that consent be unambiguous.
However, in a later, clarifying sentence, the policy adds language requiring that one’s
words or actions “clearly communicate willingness.” 61 This creates confusion when
interpreting this statute, as the later sentence seems designed to clarify the first
sentence, but in reality, it instead adds an additional standard that is substantially
different than affirmative consent.62 This additional requirement of clear,
unambiguous consent creates both social and constitutional concerns. 63
4. Substantive Rule vs. Procedural Rule
One aspect of affirmative consent policies that creates confusion and disagreement
is the standard as it relates to substantive rules (how people should behave) versus
how it relates to procedural rules (how violations are adjudicated). 64 Affirmative
consent as a substantive rule is designed to prevent assumptions about consent and to
encourage increased communication of all parties to a sexual encounter. 65 It seems
uncontroversial that these are positive goals, and if affirmative consent can help realize
them, it should be adopted as the substantive standard and immediately incorporated
into discussions about sex education and sexual assault prevention.
However, affirmative consent also carries with it a procedural and adjudicative
aspect. As a procedural rule, the affirmative consent standard includes significant
deficiencies, and it simply does not alleviate the current procedural difficulties faced
by university administrative hearing boards or courts using non-affirmative definitions
of consent. Adjudicative bodies—either courts in criminal proceedings, or university
disciplinary committees for campus incidents—play two main roles: (1) fact-finding,
and (2) interpretation of the facts to determine if consent was given. The first role,
fact-finding, is often considered the “he said, she said” portion of the process. 66
Affirmative consent fails to ease the difficulty of this process when adjudicators must
consider evidence from both sides and determine which version of the story is most
credible.67 Affirmative consent comes into play in the second role: interpretation of
the facts to determine if consent was given.68 Interpreting the often imprecise
communication between parties to a sexual encounter often represents the most
difficult task for adjudicators of sexual assault cases. 69 Unfortunately, requiring some

61

Id.

62

Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 65.

63

See discussion infra Parts III–IV.

Witmer-Rich, supra note 15, at 59 (“[T]he concept of affirmative consent carries with it
a cluster of both substantive rules (related to the definition of consent) and procedural rules
(related to how criminal prosecutions or university adjudications should be conducted).”).
64

65

Id. at 65.

66

Id. at 86.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 86–87.

69

Id. at 87.
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affirmative signal of consent will not solve this already difficult problem. 70
Furthermore, because definitions are often unclear as to what behavior is sufficient to
constitute affirmative consent, the standard is likely to be applied inconsistently,
potentially resulting in both over and under punishment.
The most widely used definitions of affirmative consent do not specifically require
express verbal permission (as permission may also be granted through actions), nor
do they require that permission be clear or unambiguous.71 With these kinds of
definitions, there is unlikely to be a constitutional violation because there is no
significant alteration of currently used consent definitions interpreted in the criminal
context almost uniformly throughout the United States. However, policies that use
affirmative consent as an adjudicative standard that require clear, unambiguous
affirmative consent are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Such policies also
violate the First Amendment’s right to free speech, as well as the constitutional right
to privacy.
B. The Role of Title IX in the Affirmative Consent Debate
Title IX requires universities to respond to sexual assault on campus to protect
student victim’s educational interests and is therefore, a significant driving factor in
the adoption of affirmative consent standards.72 Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in education programs or activities
that receive federal funding, including public colleges and universities. 73 Section 1681
states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 74 Sexual
harassment, including sexual violence, is considered sex discrimination under Title
IX. Title IX defines sexual harassment as: “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature,”
and can include “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” 75 If the behavior is serious
enough to limit a victim’s ability to participate in, or benefit from, the school’s
program, it triggers a university’s duty to act. 76 Title IX provides a private right of

70

Id.

71

Id. at 88.

72

Id. at 61.

73

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).

74

Id. at § 1681(a).

75 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 Guidance].
76

Id. at 5.
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action77 and is enforced by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights
(“OCR”) and the court system.78
In 1981, administrative guidance first prohibited employee-student harassment as
sex discrimination under Title IX.79 The Supreme Court expanded the private right of
action to allow money damages in teacher-student harassment cases, when (1) an
official with authority to address the situation has actual knowledge, and (2) the
official is “deliberately indifferent” in the response. 80 By 2000, both OCR and the
Supreme Court expanded the definition to include student to student harassment in
higher education,81 stating that:
Sexual harassment of a student can deny or limit, on the basis of sex, the
student’s ability to participate in or to receive benefits, services, or
opportunities in the school’s program. Sexual harassment of students is,
therefore, a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX under the
circumstances described in this guidance. 82
Title IX prohibits both quid pro quo harassment (usually teacher-to-student) and
hostile environment harassment, which can be either teacher-to-student, or student-tostudent.83 Title IX protects a student’s private interest in his or her education, but
focuses on accusers of sexual assault, rather than accused students.84
To protect a student victim’s education interests, Title IX requires that universities
respond to allegations of sexual assaults on campus. Under OCR's standards, a school
is in violation of Title IX when: (1) a responsible school official knew of or reasonably
should have known of harassment; and (2) the school failed to respond promptly and
effectively to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent its recurrence; or, (3) the
accused student’s conduct was unwanted and sufficiently serious to deny or limit the
harassed student’s ability to participate in an educational program or benefit.85 OCR
specifically stated that its standard for a violation is broader than the courts’
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (“[Title IX’s] only
express enforcement mechanism, § 1682, is an administrative procedure resulting in the
withdrawal of federal funding from institutions that are not in compliance. In addition, this
Court has recognized an implied private right of action . . . [for which] both injunctive relief
and damages are available.”).
77

78 Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived “Catch-22”: Providing Fairness to Both
the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault Disciplinary Proceedings, 38
J.L. & EDUC. 277, 280 (2009).
79 OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Dir. of Litig., Enf’t, & Policy Serv.,
to Reg’l Civil Rights Dirs. (Aug. 31, 1981).
80

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).

81

Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 51 (2013).
82

2001 Guidance, supra note 75, at 2.

83

Id. at 5.

84

Hogan, supra note 78, at 280.

85

2001 Guidance, supra note 75, at 12–13.
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definition.86 Therefore, colleges and universities must take reports of sexual assault
and sexual harassment seriously, and work to protect students from the academic
barriers erected by sex discrimination. This focus on protection of victims of sexual
assault played a key role in the adoption of affirmative consent standards on campuses
across the nation, as affirmative consent is widely seen as more protective.
C. First Amendment: Free Speech
Perhaps one of the most lauded and fundamental rights afforded by the United
States Constitution is the right to free speech. The First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”87 While the text provides no limiting language or modifiers, it is well-settled
that the right to free speech is not absolute.88 In Roth v. United States, Justice Brennan
stated “[i]n light of history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance.” 89 Litigation involving the
constitutional question of free speech asks “whether the First Amendment allows
public regulation of the particular communication in the circumstances under which it
was made.”90 The right not to speak is as important as the right to speak freely and the
Supreme Court has held that government compelled speech violates the First
Amendment.91 The Supreme Court held a law compelling individuals to be couriers
for ideological messages unconstitutional under the First Amendment right against
compelled speech.92
These free speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment extend to
schools, as students do not “shed constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of [the
Supreme] Court.”93 The Court held that free speech is protected on public college and
university campuses,94 further stating that First Amendment protections on college
campuses are necessary for the preservation of democracy:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation . . . Teachers and
86

Id. at 34 n.74.

87

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

88

16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 513 (2017).

89

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).

90 WILLIAM H. ERICKSON, ET AL., UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND COMMENTS:
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE ¶ 5A.03[1][a] (Matthew Bender ed. 2017).
91

See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down
state school requirement that all children must salute the American flag); see Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
92

Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705–06.

93

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

94

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.95
While private colleges and universities are not constitutionally obligated to uphold
the First Amendment rights of students, many private schools promise speech rights
in school materials.96 Courts hold that private institutions must uphold these promises
based on a theory of contract law.97 Furthermore, some states have codified free speech
protections for students on private college campuses.98 For example, California’s
“Leonard Law” prohibits private universities from punishing students for speech that
would be protected by the First Amendment if made off-campus.99
The connection between clear affirmative consent laws and free speech rights are
difficult to decipher, at least in part because of the complicated relationship between
free speech and sex in the United States. In 1957, the Supreme Court held that
obscenity is a category of speech falling totally outside the protections of the First
Amendment.100 The Roth Court specified, however, that “sex and obscenity are not
synonymous.”101 While the Court eventually established the black-letter law defining
obscenity in Miller v. California,102 several Justices expressed concern that the Court
was “unable to . . . separate obscenity from other sexually oriented but constitutionally
protected speech, so that efforts to suppress the former do not spill over into
suppression of the latter.”103
D. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Due Process and Privacy Concerns
The United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of “life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,” by either the federal government

95

Id.

96

See Fire, Private Universities, https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/public-and-privateuniversities/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
97 See Havlik v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 509 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The relevant
terms of the contractual relationship between a student and a university typically include
language found in the university’s student handbook . . . We interpret such contractual terms in
accordance with the parties’ reasonable expectations, giving those terms the meaning that the
university reasonably should expect the student to take from them.”); Corso v. Creighton Univ.,
731 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1984) (“The relationship between a university and a student is
contractual in nature.”).
98

See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (Deering 2017).

99

Id.

100

Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 486–87.

101

Id. at 487.

102

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).

103

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that “the approach initiated 16 years ago in [Roth], and culminating in the Court’s decision
today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First
Amendment values.”).
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under the Fifth Amendment,104 or by state governments under the Fourteenth
Amendment.105 The text appears to guarantee only that a person will not be deprived
of life, liberty, or property unless he has first been provided with adequate procedures.
Known as procedural due process, the doctrine encompasses the “conduct of legal
proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and
enforcement of private rights, including notice [of the charges] and the right to a fair
hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.”106
However, the Court also recognized substantive due process when laws in their
substance infringe too deeply into individual liberty. 107 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the
Court stated that the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment included:
[N]ot merely the freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 108
Scholars criticize the doctrine of substantive due process as the result of activist
judges because it is not explicitly stated in the constitutional text. 109
1. Due Process and Title IX
The interplay of due process and the requirements of Title IX can create
compliance complications for colleges and universities. To comply with the demands
of Title IX, schools must provide the student complainant with a disciplinary hearing
for the accused in response to a sexual assault allegation. 110 University disciplinary
proceedings have potentially adverse consequences for the accused student, and
because students have both a property and liberty interest in their education, those
disciplinary proceedings are subject to procedural due process rights for the
accused.111 This includes a notice of the charge, as well as a hearing before an impartial

104

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

105

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

106

Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

107

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting
the teaching of foreign language violated substantive due process).
108

Id. at 399.

109

Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 410–11 (2010).
110 2001 Guidance, supra note 75, at 14–15. “Schools have an obligation to ensure that the
educational environment is free of discrimination and cannot fulfill this obligation without
determining if sexual harassment complaints have merit.” Id. at 35 n.86.
111

Hogan, supra note 78, at 281–82.
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tribunal.112 The Supreme Court held that even suspensions of ten days or less are
sufficiently serious to trigger due process clause protections.113
Due process is not a “fixed or rigid” concept, but instead is “a flexible standard
which varies depending upon the nature of the interest affected, and the circumstances
of the deprivation.”114 Evaluation of the process that is due in a university disciplinary
proceeding requires application of three factors:
(1) the ‘private interest’ impacted by the disciplinary proceeding; (2) ‘the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest’ through the disciplinary
proceeding and the probable value of ‘additional or substitute’ procedural
safeguards; and (3) the school’s ‘interest; including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burden that would result from additional
or substitute procedural safeguards.’115
2. Right of Privacy as a Substantive Due Process Issue
Substantive due process can be justified by the idea that some laws infringe so
deeply upon protected liberties that no amount of process would be sufficient to justify
the infringement. Although the Supreme Court most often applied substantive due
process to protect primarily economic rights (including liberty of contract), 116 in the
1930s, the Court reversed course and took on a much less active role in scrutinizing
the rationality of economic legislation.117 Despite this shift, the doctrine of substantive
due process has thrived, particularly as applied to the concept of liberty and certain
fundamental individual rights, such as those relating to family and sexual matters, the
right to vote, the right to travel, and the right to privacy. 118 The Court has held that
activities falling within the constitutional scope of right to privacy include matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and family relationships, and has
further established that there are limitations to states’ power to “substantively regulate
conduct.”119
The Court determined that these fundamental individual rights should be protected
by the most rigorous form of judicial review: strict scrutiny. 120 Strict scrutiny requires
that the government demonstrate a compelling interest, the regulation must be
absolutely essential, and the regulation must be so “narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.”121
112

Id. at 283.

113

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–75 (1975).

114 Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
115

Hogan, supra note 78, at 283 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976)).

116

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 67 (1905).

117

See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389–90 (1937).

118

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

119

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).

120

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973).

121

Id. at 155.
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Although the Court recognized a right to privacy related to procreation and
contraception, sexual privacy has not always been clearly protected by the
constitutional right to privacy. In 1986, the Supreme Court found no constitutional
protection for sexual privacy when they upheld a challenged sodomy statute. 122
However, the Court overruled that holding in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, which
invalidated sodomy laws in every state, thereby making it unconstitutional for states
to criminalize same-sex consensual sexual activity.123
III. CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT: DANGER OF POLICING SEX AND PUNISHING
CONSENTING ADULTS
The United States has a history of policing sex, particularly minimizing the sexual
autonomy of women and sexual activity among members of the same sex. 124 The U.S.
criminalized homosexual conduct for much of the nation’s history, and only received
recognized constitutional protection in 2003.125 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court
struck down a Texas law prohibiting sodomy between same sex partners. 126 Prior to
Lawrence, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, and
held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause did not confer a right to
engage in consensual sodomy, even in the private home, stating that “[t]he issue
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States
that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.” 127
The Lawrence Court faced its prior precedent in Bowers head-on, stating that the
Bowers Court “fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.” 128 Lawrence
invalidated the statute because it involved the “intimacies . . . of physical relationship,”
and such personal choices should be free from governmental interference. 129 Lawrence
prohibits regulation or interference from the government of consensual sex. 130
A. Clear Affirmative Consent: Hypotheticals with Consenting Adults
Strict interpretations of clear affirmative consent policies could criminalize even
consensual encounters where both parties willingly participated but did not
communicate that willingness at the level required by the clear affirmative consent
standard. This violates the Court’s holding in Lawrence, as clear affirmative consent
policies could easily be enforced against consenting adults. For example, a college
student playfully grabbing her boyfriend’s rear end as he walks by would be
122 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
123

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

124 REGULATING SEX: THE POLITICS OF INTIMACY AND IDENTITY 14–15 (Elizabeth Bernstein
& Laurie Schaffner eds., 2005).
125

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.

126

Id. at 560.

127

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.

128

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.

129

Id. at 578.

130

Id. at 560.
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considered non-consensual sexual contact, even if she has done it every day for a year,
and even if he subjectively desired the contact, unless she asked first (or if he invited
her to do it). Under the strictest interpretation of clear affirmative consent standards
this would be a non-consensual sexual encounter. Even something as ubiquitous as
running up and kissing a significant other on the lips without express permission
would fail to meet the clear affirmative consent standard. Even if the assumption is
made that the parties to these events had previously agreed that low-level public
affection (even with a sexual intent) is agreeable, under strict clear affirmative consent,
that would be insufficient to comply, because these policies typically require ongoing
consent, and prior consent does not indicate future consent.131
This is problematic, as it opens the door for governmental policing of sexual
conduct. Suppose the two hypothetical incidents discussed above happened on a
college campus and were observed by a member of the campus disciplinary
committee. The initiating student could be subject to disciplinary action and
punishment, even absent a complaint by the supposed “victim.”
B. Real World Punishment of Consenting Adults
It may seem ridiculous that a university would move forward with disciplinary
proceedings in the face of a victim denying wrongdoing, however, for Colorado State
University-Pueblo (“CSUP”) student Grant Neal, that is precisely what occurred.132 A
female student in the athletic training program (only referred to anonymously as
“complainant”) alleged that Mr. Neal raped Jane Doe (“Ms. Doe”) after noticing a
hickey on Jane Doe’s neck.133 The complainant made the allegation to university
officials without informing Ms. Doe or Mr. Neal.134 Both Mr. Neal and Ms. Doe
repeatedly insisted that the sex was consensual, and in fact, Ms. Doe never reported to
anyone, including complainant, that the sex was non-consensual.135 Ms. Doe stated,
“he’s a good guy. He’s not a rapist, he’s not a criminal, it’s not even worth any of this
hoopla!”136 However, the university continued with disciplinary proceedings, found
Mr. Neal responsible for sexual misconduct, and ultimately suspended him for the
duration of Ms. Doe’s education at CSUP.137
The subsequent suit brought by Mr. Neal alleged the university’s violations of
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and sex discrimination
under Title IX.138 He also subsequently filed suit against the federal government,
alleging that it coerced the state to conduct the hearings in a manner that violated due
131

Evan Gerstmann, The Constitutional Right to Sexual Autonomy and Affirmative Consent,
Address at 2018 Western Political Science Association Annual Conference 7 (Loyola
Marymount Univ., 2018).
132 Neal v. Colo. State Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-cv-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045, at *1 (D.
Colo. Feb. 16, 2017).
133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id. at *2.

137

Id. at *4.

138

Id. at *5.
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process and Title IX, and thus had further put pressure on CSUP to find males
responsible for sexual misconduct, regardless of the available evidence. 139 In July
2017, Mr. Grant and CSUP reached an undisclosed settlement agreement. 140
Although this case did not challenge an affirmative consent standard, it illustrates
the dangers inherent in enforcing a clear affirmative consent policy. This is
particularly true in the context of college campuses where disciplinary hearings only
use a clear and convincing or preponderance of the evidence standard; there are no
safeguards in place against abusing these policies, resulting in abuses of power and
policing sex. To partially reign in possible of abuses of power related to enforcement
of clear affirmative consent policies, universities could institute policies requiring
corroboration from the alleged victim in cases where a third-party reports an
allegation. While adoption of this policy would likely decrease the ability of university
officials to police sexual conduct (at least as related to enforcing clear affirmative
consent standards), this policy would prove problematic in cases where an alleged
victim has been threatened, which could result in dangerous sexual predators escaping
punishment.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES WITH CLEAR AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT POLICIES
As discussed above, affirmative consent does not represent a significant departure
from rape and sexual assault law as defined in most American jurisdictions. However,
the further requirement that affirmative consent also be clear and unambiguous does
represent a substantial change from current law and raises constitutional concerns.
This analysis and discussion focuses on clear, unambiguous affirmative consent
policies (“clear affirmative consent”).
A. First Amendment: Analytical Challenges with Clear Affirmative Consent
The task of analyzing clear affirmative consent policies in the context of free
speech is inexact, because this type of policy does not fit neatly into any of the
previously litigated classifications of speech regulations. Sexual communication and
sexual encounters can be inherently awkward and imprecise. Clear affirmative consent
policies do not prohibit speech or compel speech in the traditional First Amendment
sense.141 Instead, the government has waded into this sphere requiring individuals to
meet an ill-defined, but exacting level of precision, within sexual communication, or
risk facing severe punishment.
There is no precedent regarding this type of government regulation because
requiring a particular level of precision in speech is not typical. Although an unusual
way to regulate speech, clear affirmative consent standards limit free expression in
139

Id. at *6.

Kayla Schiebecker, Athlete Accused of Rape by Colorado State – Not His Sex Partner –
Is
Getting
Paid
to
Drop
Lawsuit,
COLLEGE FIX (July 19, 2017),
https://www.thecollegefix.com/athlete-accused-rape-colorado-state-not-sex-partner-gettingpaid-drop-lawsuit/. On July 14, 2017, a joint status report was filed with the court, indicating
that Mr. Grant and CSU-Pueblo were nearing a settlement agreement including both monetary
and non-monetary terms. The Federal defendants in the case were not part of settlement
discussions with the Plaintiff.
140

141 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also William M. Howard,
Constitutional Challenges to Compelled Speech – Particular Situations or Circumstances, 73
A.L.R. 6th 281, 281 (2012).
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violation of the First Amendment. The requirement of consent in sexual encounters is
a substantive requirement of law and is clearly constitutionally permissible, however,
the further requirement of clear, unambiguous consent (particularly when that is not
clearly defined) raises First Amendment concerns. 142
1. Overbreadth as a Constitutional Concern
From a First Amendment perspective, this Note does not argue that the First
Amendment rights of a would-be rapist would be infringed. In cases where one party
alleges that the encounter was non-consensual, no First Amendment concern is raised
because violence is not protected speech. 143 Therefore, any consent law as applied to
the free speech rights of an attacker would likely be upheld. However, under strict
interpretations of clear affirmative consent policies, the rights of law-abiding citizens
are violated. These policies are unconstitutionally overbroad because they reach
protected speech—sexual encounters that both parties subjectively agree were
consensual.144
Regulations of any speech, whether protected or unprotected, must not be overly
broad or so vague that the average citizen cannot understand what is allowed or
prohibited.145 Overly broad speech regulates substantially more speech than is
permissible under the First Amendment. 146 For example, a law banning all
photographs containing nudity is overly broad. 147 The Court held that pornography
may be regulated if it is obscene,148 but other expression must be allowed to contain
nudity, like art.149 Here, strict clear affirmative consent laws are unnecessarily broad
in that they purport to regulate all sexual activity, including that which is mutually
desired, but still violates the clear affirmative consent policy. 150
Statutes may be challenged as “facially” invalid, “because of a judicial prediction
or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court
142

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).

143 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The First Amendment
does not protect violence.”).
144

See discussion supra Part III-A.

145

Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982).

146 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 648, 652 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (holding that overbreadth doctrine did not apply, because child-pornography law was not
facially challenged, but was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because
implementation of the statute resulted in blocking significant amounts of constitutionally
protected speech). Here, clear affirmative consent policies are facially overbroad, as they
purport to regulate all sexual conduct, even between two willing, consenting adults.
147

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 28 (1973).

148 Id. at 23–24 (“This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene
material is unprotected by the First Amendment . . . As a result, we now confine the permissible
scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct . . . A state offense
must also be limited to works which . . . portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”)
(internal citations omitted).
149

Id. at 26.

150

See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
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to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” 151 An overbroad law
is often too vague for a reasonable person to understand what behavior is prohibited
and what behavior is not. To avoid breaking an overbroad law, many people will
voluntarily choose not to engage in behavior protected by the First Amendment or
another basic right just to be sure they are not accidentally breaking the overbroad law.
Since these laws either infringe on basic rights or encourage people to avoid exercising
basic rights, most courts recognize that anyone who is affected by an overbroad law
has standing to challenge the law’s overbreadth on behalf of all persons affected by
that law.152
B. Violation of the First Amendment’s Right to Free Speech
A clear affirmative consent standard violates the First Amendment rights of free
speech of consenting adults. While the First Amendment's language at first appears to
be unambiguous and absolute, the Supreme Court has not regarded the text as absolute
and has categorically denied free speech protections for certain kinds of speech:
obscenity, true threats, fighting words, perjury, blackmail, incitement to imminent
lawless action, solicitation to commit crimes, defamation, and plagiarism of
copyrighted material.153 Justice Holmes understood that free speech is not absolute
when he wrote, “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic,” 154 and the government may
take action to prevent or punish such speech. 155
It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment was protected from impairment not only from the
national government, but from state governments, as protected under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.156 The Fourteenth Amendment states, in
relevant part “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”157
1. Sexual Communication as Protected Speech
To challenge a law regulating speech, one must first determine what constitutes
protected speech.158 Sexual communication between two consenting adults is pure
speech.159 An ignoble theme of First Amendment law is that, when faced with difficult
speech questions, the Supreme Court often avoids the issue by determining that the

151

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).

152

Id.

153

16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 953 (2017).

154

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

155

Id.

156

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).

157

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

158

Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 905 F. Supp. 2d
317, 328 (2012).
159

Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).
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law at issue regulates conduct rather than speech.160 Because clear affirmative consent
standards purport to regulate the procurement of consent, it is possible that courts
would attempt to avoid the First Amendment question altogether by stating that this is
conduct rather than speech. However, conduct that is considered expressive is
accorded First Amendment protections as symbolic speech. 161 The communication of
participants in a sexual encounter may be comprised exclusively of conduct. If courts
are hesitant to define sexual communication as pure speech in and of itself, courts
must determine if that conduct is expressive.
Whether conduct has an expressive element is determined by a two-part test.162
Conduct is deemed expressive if (1) the actor intended to express a particularized
message and (2) that message is understood by the audience.163 Here, the act of
seduction or request for consent indicates a particularized message or idea and is able
to be understood by the audience: “I am interested in sexual contact with you.” Further,
the act of the consenting party is also expressive conduct that is understood by the
audience: “sex is welcome.” The two-part test to determine expressive conduct sets a
low bar and recognizes that a wide-range of conduct can be considered expressive.164
Treating sexual conduct as expressive satisfies the two-part test and is consistent with
the First Amendment’s purpose. At its most basic level, sexual communication is
protected speech, whether verbal or non-verbal. The government should not compel
enthusiastic response to a request for a sexual encounter in order that the encounter
not be criminalized.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing sodomy against a due
process claim, finding that the statute was rationally related to the state’s interest in
protecting morality.165 Although not decided on free speech grounds, the Court’s
rationale for allowing the state to regulate sodomy (upholding notions of morality)
indicates that sexual activity is inherently communicative: “upholding community
morals—is inextricably related to what sodomy expresses to the community . . .
Because homosexual conduct between consenting adults can have no effect on society
other than by virtue of what it communicates, its regulation should trigger searching
examination by a reviewing court.”166 Although the argument was raised that sodomy
within the privacy of the home should be protected based on Stanley v. Georgia—
holding that the First Amendment prohibited conviction for possession of obscene
material within the privacy of the home—the Bowers Court rejected this argument.167

160

See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).

161

16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 922 (2017).

162

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (holding that the display of a flag with
a peace symbol affixed to it was constitutionally protected speech, and statute was
unconstitutional as applied to defendant).
163

Id. at 414–15.

164

David D. Cole, From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (1994).
165 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, (2003).
166

Cole, supra note 164, at 323.

167

Bowers, supra note 165, at 195.
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The Court stated that the holding of Stanley was based firmly on First Amendment
rights, rather than Fourteenth Amendment due process. 168
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers.169 While not decided on First
Amendment grounds, the Court expressed that states should not:
[D]efine the meaning of the [personal] relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It
suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. 170
Nude dancing has also been considered “expressive conduct” by eight Supreme
Court Justices.171 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia defined “inherently
expressive conduct” as conduct “that is normally engaged in for the purpose of
communicating an idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone else.”172 Sex clearly meets
this definition of inherently expressive conduct. Sex between two persons is inherently
communicative at its core, and may express any number of emotions: love, desire, or
even anger.173 No matter the degree—kissing, holding hands, or intercourse—sex is
inherently communicative and expressive, and should be considered protected speech
for the purposes of First Amendment protection.
2. Compelled Speech
Free speech violations can be broadly grouped into two categories: (1) compelled
speech and (2) restricted speech. One of the most fundamental tenants in free speech
jurisprudence is that the right not to speak is protected as fiercely as the right to
speak.174 One of the problems with the government essentially requiring a script for
sex is that it appears, at first glance, like government compelled speech. However,
clear affirmative consent standards would likely not fall within the compelled speech
doctrine as historically defined because it does not require communication of an
ideological message.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court struck
down a state law requiring school children to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of

168

Id.

169

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

170

Id. at 566–67.

171

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).

172

Id. at 578 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring).

Cole, supra note 164, at 326 (“Indeed, the communicative power of sex is often
unmatched by other forms of communication. To say, ‘I love you’ is one thing; to hold a lover’s
hand in public to express one’s love can express something quite different; and ‘to make love’
is often a still more profound expression of what one feels and thinks.”).
173

174

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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Allegiance.175 Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused to salute the flag, challenged the law
citing religious grounds. Their children were “expelled from school and . . . threatened
with exclusion for no other cause.” 176 Justice Jackson wrote what is perhaps the most
often cited passage in First Amendment case law, stating that if “there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion.”177
Not all government compelled speech is problematic. For example, the
government compels all citizens to report income each year for income taxes and the
government restricts commercial speech in various ways.178 Courts have typically only
prohibited government compelled speech when the speech communicates an officially
mandated ideology.179 In 1977, the Supreme Court again struck down a law
compelling government speech when a New Hampshire couple was prosecuted three
times for covering up the motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plate. 180 The
couple, also Jehovah’s Witnesses, objected to the motto on religious grounds. 181 Chief
Justice Burger stated that the law prohibiting obscuring or defacing license plates
could not be enforced against the couple because the law compelled individuals to be
“couriers for ideological messages” and “mobile billboards.”182 The Court found a
“freedom of mind” that protects individuals from government coercion to
communicate an officially mandated ideology.183
To argue that clear affirmative consent standards offend the compelled speech
doctrine as historically interpreted would require a considerable expansion of the
doctrine, as there is no ideology communicated in clear affirmative consent. As such,
even the strictest interpretations of clear affirmative consent standards are unlikely to
meet the current criteria to be considered compelled speech. However, as previously
discussed, the regulation at issue charges individuals with inspiring or compelling
speech from another, with the further requirement that the inspired speech be clear and
unambiguous to avoid punishment. This atypical regulatory scheme may warrant a
closer look at, and potential expansion of, the compelled speech doctrine.
3. Restricting Speech
The Supreme Court has had a complicated relationship with restrictions on
sexually explicit speech. While obscenity is not protected speech under the First

175

Id. at 629.

176

Id. at 630.

177

Id. at 642.

178 Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995); United States v. Edge Broad. Co.,
509 U.S. 418, 436 (1993); Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 620 (6th Cir. 2014).
179

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,713 (1977).

180

Id. at 708.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 715.

183

Id. at 714–15.
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Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that not all sexual speech is obscene. 184 In
Roth, the Court stated:
Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest . . . Sex, a great
mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern. 185
The Supreme Court has generally struck down prohibitions on non-obscene nudity
and erotic expressive conduct, but in 1991, the Court upheld a ban on nude dancing,
reasoning that it was part of a general prohibition of public nudity. 186 Although nude
dancing has been considered expressive conduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
the statute did not run afoul of the Constitution because the law was not aimed at the
erotic message, but rather at the perceived evil of public nudity, generally. 187
It is well-settled that “a law imposing criminal penalties on protected speech is a
stark example of speech suppression.”188 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
Court invalidated a federal law banning virtual child pornography (pornography which
appears to, but does not actually, depict children) as overbroad, and thus violating the
First Amendment because the speech ban was not narrowly drawn. 189 The Court
reasoned that the statute went “well beyond” an interest in prohibiting only illegal
conduct by “restricting speech available to law-abiding adults.”190
4. Level of Scrutiny
Typically, in First Amendment cases, strict scrutiny is applied to laws that regulate
speech if the regulation is content-based. Strict scrutiny requires that the government
must have a compelling interest and the regulation must be absolutely essential and
narrowly tailored to achieve that end.191 Although the government has a compelling
interest in the prevention of rape and sexual assault, “[a]mong free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations

184

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (citations omitted).

Id. The Court went on to define “prurient interest” as “material having a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts.” Id. at 487 n.20.
185

186

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991).

187

Id.

188

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).

189

Id. at 252–53.

190

Id. The Court stated that because actual children were not harmed or exploited in creating
the virtual child pornography, the central rationale behind making child pornography a category
of wholly unprotected speech (creation of the speech is itself the crime of child abuse) did not
apply to the virtual depictions. Id. at 254–55.
191

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
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of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech.”192 Merely the prospect of crime
“by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.” 193
Strict clear affirmative consent standards go well beyond a government interest in
preventing crime and intrude into constitutionally prohibited territory by compelling
a particularly demanding level of precision in sexual communication. This, in turn,
constrains the speech of even consenting adults. If the Court applied strict scrutiny to
a First Amendment challenge of clear affirmative consent laws, the government is
very unlikely to succeed.
However, clear affirmative consent policies are not so easy to classify as contentbased or content-neutral. Content-based restrictions are enacted for the purpose of
restraining speech on the basis of its content, and presumptively violate the First
Amendment.194 Conversely, content-neutral restrictions (time, place, and manner
restrictions) are subject to intermediate scrutiny and do not violate the First
Amendment “so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.” 195 In Renton,
the Court considered a zoning law regulating the location of adult theatres and stated
that the ordinance did not, at first glance:
[A]ppear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’ or the ‘content-neutral’
category. To be sure, the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult
films differently from other kinds of theaters. Nevertheless . . . the Renton
ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion
picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surrounding community.196
If challenged on free speech grounds, the government is likely to argue that clear
affirmative consent is not meant to regulate the content of the speech, except to ensure
that the consent law’s substantive requirement of consent is met. In other words, clear
affirmative consent is concerned with regulating a secondary effect (sexual assault)
rather than regulating the content of individuals’ sexual communications. The Court
in Renton eventually held that zoning ordinances designed to combat objectionable
secondary effects should be considered content-neutral, “at least with respect to
businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials,” and therefore, subject to
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. 197
While intermediate scrutiny is a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny, it
provides a more in-depth inquiry than the rational basis test. The government would
easily meet the first prong of the test, as preventing sexual assault is a substantial
government interest.198 However, the second prong is more difficult to meet. Clear
192 Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)
(citation omitted).
193

Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245.

194

Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986).

195

Id. at 47.

196

Id.

197

Id. at 49.

198

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583 (1991).
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affirmative consent polices cannot be said to leave open reasonable alternatives for
communication. Because these policies require such an exacting level of precision,
even intermediate scrutiny will be a difficult hurdle to clear. It is important to note that
affirmative consent policies without the further requirement of clear and unambiguous
consent are more likely to survive intermediate scrutiny, as those policies allow for
significant freedom in sexual communication, while still protecting the consent
requirement.
C. Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Right to Privacy
In addition to First Amendment free speech and overbreadth concerns, clear
affirmative consent policies also raise substantive due process concerns. Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, statutes that punish an individual for something
not clearly defined runs afoul of substantive due process and can be struck down as
unconstitutionally vague.199
1. Vagueness as a Constitutional Concern
Laws are considered void for vagueness if it would be impossible for a reasonable
person to determine what speech or conduct is sufficient and/or necessary to be in
compliance with the law.200 The Court has held that a statute forbidding or requiring
an act must not be so vague that “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.” 201 Unconstitutional vagueness extends
the vagueness doctrine to the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, with courts holding that vague criminal laws deprive citizens of rights
without fair process, and such laws are thus, unconstitutional.202 In 1971, the Florida
Supreme Court struck down the state’s sodomy law as “unconstitutional for vagueness
and uncertainty in its language,” holding that a reasonable person could not know for
certain whether the statute prohibited oral sex (or if it was restricted to only anal
penetration) as an “abominable and detestable crime against nature.” 203
Unfortunately, clear affirmative consent statutes, though aiming to clarify consent
rules, have instead muddied the waters and made it less clear what speech or conduct
is required to avoid violation of the policy. Although courts have typically applied the
unconstitutional vagueness test to criminal statutes for violation of due process, it
would likely be applicable even in non-criminal statutes governing university policies
because the Supreme Court has recognized, though never explicitly held, that
university students have property and liberty rights in their education that are protected

199 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261–62 (2016) (noting that the void-forvagueness doctrine is “a doctrine that is mandated by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment (with respect to the federal government) and the Fourteenth Amendment (with
respect to the States).”) (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)).
200 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (holding that a statute imposing
severe punishments on State contractors paying employees less than the “current rate of per
diem wages in the locality where the work is performed,” was void for vagueness and
uncertainty, presenting a “double uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal statute”).
201

Id. at 391.

202

Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).

203

Id.
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by the Constitution.204 In 1975, the Court considered due process rights of students at
the elementary and secondary levels, holding that a suspension without a hearing
violated due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 205 Lower courts have
expanded Goss, holding that university students have a liberty and property interest in
their education, and attempts to deprive students of those interests—through
suspension or expulsion—must comport with due process.206
Because students’ education rights are protected under due process, the
unconstitutional vagueness doctrine would apply to both criminal clear affirmative
consent statutes and statutes governing university sexual assault policies. 207
Particularly with sexual communication, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
what clear or unambiguous consent looks like at the margins, particularly when many
statutes require continuous consent.
Clearly, asking for verbal consent, “may I kiss you?” and receiving a verbal “yes”
would constitute clear affirmative consent for kissing. But, as the sexual encounter
escalates, clear consent must be continually obtained. While some activity can be
clearly distinguished from another activity (for instance, consent obtained for kissing
is not sufficient to be considered consent for intercourse), lines cannot be drawn so
clearly for many of the varying degrees of sexual activity. For example, if consent has
been obtained for kissing, must separate consent also be obtained to wrap arms around
a partner? If consent has been granted to remove clothing, must consent also be
obtained to now touch the exposed skin? Once a particular sexual activity has
commenced, how often must consent be renewed to remain in compliance with
continuous consent requirements? Answers to these questions are elusive and amount
to speculation at best. Therefore, many of these policies would be unconstitutionally
vague and unenforceable.
2. Dangers of Clear Affirmative Consent as the Criminal Standard
Even in the criminal arena, there has been significant pushback from the legal
community in response to proposed changes to the Model Penal Code’s (“MPC”)
definition of affirmative consent.208 In May 2016, the American Law Institute (“ALI”)
rejected a definition of consent for the MPC that would move it closer to affirmative

204

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).

205 Id. at 574 (“Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a student’s
legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due
Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the
minimum procedures required by that Clause.”).
206 See, e.g., Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1339 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987) (“A preliminary
question here would be whether the appellants have been deprived of any constitutionally
protected rights by their suspension. Although the students’ complaint does not specify which
rights they claim to have been deprived of, we note that, at a minimum, the students’ protected
liberty interest is at stake because of the ‘stigma’ attached to suspension from college for
disciplinary reasons.”) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 574–76).
207

Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 547 n.4 (6th Cir. 2013).

208 Jennifer Morinigo, The Evolution of the Model Penal Code “Consent” Definition, ALI
ADVISER (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.thealiadviser.org/sexual-assault/evolution-of-modelpenal-code-consent-definition/.
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consent.209 In 2014 and 2015, the ALI Annual Meeting drafts for proposed changes
were the same, and included the following definition of “consent” in section 213.0(3):
“‘Consent’ means a person’s positive agreement, communicated by either words or
actions, to engage in sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”210 This definition was hotly
debated at the 2015 Annual Meeting, with critics arguing that, as written, the definition
adopted an affirmative consent standard and “strayed too far from existing cultural
norms.”211 As a result, the committee returned to the 2016 Annual Meeting with a new,
more convoluted definition:
(a) “Consent” means a person’s behavior, including words and
conduct— both action and inaction—that communicates the person’s
willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual
contact . . .
(c) Consent may be express, or it may be inferred from a person’s behavior.
Neither verbal nor physical resistance is required to establish the absence
of consent; the person’s behavior must be assessed in the context of all the
circumstances to determine whether the person has consented.
(d) Consent may be revoked any time before or during the act of
sexual penetration or sexual contact, by behavior communicating that the
person is no longer willing. A clear verbal refusal—such as “No,” “Stop,”
or “Don’t”—suffices to establish the lack of consent. A clear verbal refusal
also suffices to withdraw previously communicated willingness in the
absence of subsequent behavior that communicates willingness before the
sexual act occurs.212
One hundred and twenty members signed a letter to ALI, urging members to vote
no, voicing concerns about due process and burden-shifting caused by the proposed
definition, as well as the dangers of criminalization of consensual sexual activity. The
ALI members wrote:
The prosecutor need only say, ‘Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, under
the State’s definition, it does not matter whether the complainant actually
was willing. It is undisputed that the sex act occurred and there is no
evidence in the record that the complainant communicated willingness.
There is no consent if the complainant has not communicated willingness.

209 Bradford Richardson, American Law Institute rejects affirmative consent standard in
defining
sexual
assault,
WASH.
TIMES
(May
17,
2016),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/17/american-law-institute-rejectsaffirmative-consent/.
210

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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You must convict if you find that the defendant recklessly disregarded that
absence of consent.213
3. Constitutional Right to Privacy
Currently, the constitutional right to privacy is held to reside in due process.
However, the Supreme Court previously recognized a “penumbra” of right to privacy
in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including in the First Amendment.214 The Court
struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting the sale, possession, and distribution of
contraception to married couples holding that it was unnecessarily broad, and thus
unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of marital privacy.215 The Court offered
multiple justifications for this decision, ranging from Justice Douglas’s penumbra
theory, stating that without “peripheral rights,” other constitutional rights would be
“less secure,”216 to Justice Goldberg’s interpretation that the Ninth Amendment
provides justification for protecting privacy, 217 to Justice Harlan’s argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty clause proscribed this kind of far-reaching state
action.218
In 1972, the Court extended the right to privacy to even unmarried individuals by
invalidating a law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.219
The Court found the law to be in conflict with fundamental human rights and stated,
“[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 220
The Supreme Court even concluded, in a unanimous decision, that the right to
privacy protects an individual’s right to possess and view otherwise unprotected
obscenity in his own home. 221 Justice Marshall relied on both the First and Fourth
Amendments to conclude that no matter the justifications for obscenity laws, those
justifications do not reach into the sanctity of the home. 222 “If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole

213

Over 110 ALI Members Express Concerns About Sexual Assault Project,
CRIMPROFBLOG
(Apr.
18,
2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2016/04/over-110-ali-members-expressconcerns-about-sexual-assault-project.html.
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Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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Id. at 485–86.
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Id. at 482–83.
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Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Id. at 500–01 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men’s minds.”223
Over time, the Court has moved away from the “penumbra” theory of right to
privacy, shifting in favor of a constitutional right to privacy residing in the liberty
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under substantive due process. 224
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the “right of privacy . . . founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action” is a
fundamental right and any state regulation must therefore be subjected to strict
scrutiny.225 In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy stated:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.’226
The clear affirmative consent standard regulates not just speech between persons
prior to sexual encounters, but throughout one of the most intimate experiences in
human existence. Clear affirmative consent standards intrude into the most private
portion of the home, the bedroom—and indeed—the bed itself. These policies clearly
violate the constitutional right to privacy between two consenting adults.
V. CONCLUSION
Affirmative consent has garnered both support and opposition. Both proponents
and critics, though, tend to confuse the issues and misunderstand what an affirmative
consent policy does—or does not do—as well as falsely equate affirmative consent as
a substantive standard versus an adjudicative standard. Affirmative consent, generally,
does not represent a substantial modification of currently existing rape and sexual
assault law in most jurisdictions. However, policies that further require that
affirmative consent be clear or unambiguous do represent a considerable change.
As substantive policies, affirmative consent policies are positive and encourage
people to not only communicate prior to engaging in sexual encounters, but to check
for understanding. They also decrease the possibility of error or confusion, thus
ensuring a more positive sexual experience for all involved. Teaching young people
that affirmative consent is the only appropriate benchmark for initiating sexual activity
is important and may well be transformative.
However, as an adjudicative standard, clear affirmative consent policies do not
resolve—or even simplify—the difficulties currently faced in university sexual assault
disciplinary hearings: determining what happened and then deciding if what happened
amounts to proper consent. Further, clear affirmative consent standards, as currently
223

Id.
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See, e.g., Kline ex rel. Arndt v. Mansfield, 454 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2006).

225 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
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written and implemented, increase the dangers of policing sex, are overbroad, violate
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and the privacy rights of consenting adults,
and are unconstitutionally vague. These policies violate essential rights and freedoms
and do not solve the problems inherent with current interpretations of consent law.
Rape and sexual assault continue to be significant, growing problems on college
campuses and efforts to prevent and punish these kinds of incidents should be
applauded. Those efforts should not, however, trample liberty in the process.
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